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Principled Remedial Discretion
Under the Charter
Kent Roach*

The Supreme Court of Canada decided a number of cases in 2003
that confirmed the importance of remedial discretion under the Charter.
The most well-known and controversial was Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova
Scotia (Minister of Education).1 In that case, the Court upheld the discretion of a trial judge under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms2 to order that the government make best efforts to
provide French language schools by certain times in various parts of
Nova Scotia, and require the government to report back to the trial judge
on its compliance with the order. The Court, however, was closely and
firmly divided with four judges arguing in dissent that the trial judge
had abused his discretion by violating the separation of powers; by acting after his jurisdiction had been exhausted; and by issuing a vague
remedial order. Doucet-Boudreau may encourage trial judges to exercise
supervisory jurisdiction in Charter cases and to order Charter remedies
that are more specific than the general declarations that have generally
been used in the past. But much will depend on how trial judges exercise this discretion in the future.
Doucet-Boudreau was not the only victory for the remedial discretion of trial judges. In British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v.
Okanagan Indian Band,3 the Supreme Court also made clear that trial
judges have a discretion to order interim or advance costs in public
interest litigation with a minority raising concerns that the Court had
provided no real guidance as to how trial judges should exercise this
expanded discretion. In addition, the Supreme Court was not above

*

Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76.
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exercising some remedial discretion of its own in 2003. It suspended
declarations of invalidity in three cases4 but in only two of those cases
did the Court attempt to apply the restrictive rules in Schachter5 for
suspending a declaration of invalidity. In a fourth case, R. v. Powley, it
determined that there were no compelling reasons to extend a stay or
period of suspension.6
The remedial cases decided by the Court this year provide a good
vehicle for discussing the importance of remedial discretion under the
Charter and the variety of approaches that can be taken to conceptualizing and governing the exercise of remedial discretion. In the first part of
this paper, I will address the issue of remedial discretion at a general and
conceptual level. I will argue that the remedial discretion of trial judges
is a fundamental feature of the Charter and one that distinguishes it from
the Canadian Bill of Rights.7 The Charter embraces the common sense
notion that rights will not be meaningful without remedies, but it also
contemplates that remedial decision-making will be heavily dependent
on context and the trial judge’s exercise of discretion. I will then outline
three different types of discretion that can be exercised by trial judges.
The first is strong discretion, in the sense that it is or appears not to be
governed either by rules or principles, especially those that are articulated and applied by appellate courts. A second kind of discretion is in
part a reaction to the unconstrained freedom of pure discretion. It is a
regime of ruled-based discretion in which the remedial discretion of trial
judges is cabined by rules or pigeon holes enumerated by the appellate
courts. A third form of discretion is principled remedial discretion
which is not under-governed by law in the way of pure discretion or
over-governed by self-executing categories and rules. Principled remedial discretion involves a judge applying general principles, such as the
need for effective remedies and respect for institutional role, to the context of a particular violation.

4
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 32; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003]
S.C.J. No. 54; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 37.
5
Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68.
6
R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
7
S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
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The three categories that I outline are evaluative, dynamic, and controversial. What one person sees as a principled test for the exercise of
discretion can appear to another person to be overly constrained by rules
and examples. For example, the three-part Stillman8 test for the exclusion of evidence is criticized by many as being based on inflexible and
unsound rules that fetter the trial judge’s ability to balance the competing interests. At the same time, it can be defended as offering special
protections for the accused’s broad right against self-incrimination while
allowing the trial judge to balance the seriousness of the violation
against the adverse effects of excluding evidence in cases that do not
threaten the fairness of trials. Similarly, there are disputes about the rule
in Rahey9 requiring a stay of proceedings as the minimal remedy for a
violation of the right to a trial in a reasonable time under section 11(b)
of the Charter. For some, it is an inflexible rule that can lead to unexpected consequences such as the Askov crisis, while to others it is a
principled and purposive approach that recognizes the unfairness to the
accused of requiring a trial after an unreasonable period of delay. In
Schachter v. Canada,10 Lamer C.J.C. for a majority of the Court stressed
that section 1 analysis could provide helpful principles for deciding
whether to extend underinclusive legislation by reading in, while La
Forest J. expressed a concern that it could “encourage a mechanistic
approach to the process, rather than encourage examination of more
fundamental issues.” A principled approach to remedial discretion
forces judges to justify their remedial choices, but it can result in disagreements, as seen in the dissents in both Stillman and Rahey.
Recognizing the contingency of the categories, and especially the
sometimes elusive distinction between inflexible rules and sound
8

R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34. Note that in R. v. Buhay,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, the Court deferred to a trial judge’s exercise of
discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to avoid condoning a
serious Charter violation.
9
R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; [1987] S.C.J. No. 23. In R. v. Taillefer (sub nom.
R. v. Duguay), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at para. 121, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, the Court indicated
that a new trial would be the minimal remedy when the accused’s right to full answer and
defence had been violated by a disclosure violation. The Court indicated that a stay would be
appropriate only in cases where a new trial would perpetuate “an injustice and would tarnish
the integrity of our judicial system” by violating the “community’s sense of fair play and
decency.” Id., at para. 128.
10
Supra , note 5, at 729, para. 110.
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principles, I will still argue that the remedial decisions of courts can be
improved if judges recognize and attempt to avoid the dangers associated with both strong and rule-based discretion. Although there will be
continued reasonable disagreement in the hardest of cases, remedial
decision-making can be improved by avoiding the extremes of unfettered discretion and overly fettered discretion. Principled exercise of
remedial discretion is not a recipe for agreement or even reliably right
answers, but it is a recipe for fuller reflection and reasons as judges
attempt to justify particular remedial decisions in relation to general
principles relating to the appropriate role of the courts in ensuring that
there are meaningful remedies for violations of Charter rights.
In the remaining parts of the paper, I will examine recent remedial
decisions of the Supreme Court with the above categories in mind. My
analysis of each case will attempt to recognize the range of debate about
how the exercise of remedial discretion fits into the three categories of
strong, rule-based, and principled discretion. At the same time, I will
suggest some techniques that the courts might use to improve and
sharpen their remedial decisions. Remedial decisions can usefully be
evaluated on the basis of whether they escape the dangers of strong
discretion by giving principled and purposive reasons and whether they
escape the dangers of inflexible rules or pigeonholes by articulating the
general principles that are relevant not only to the case at hand, but to
other cases. This year’s remedial cases present a particularly rich field to
discuss many of the most difficult remedial decisions made under the
Charter. In the end, I hope to provide some ideas that will help make the
exercise of discretion to order injunctions and to retain jurisdiction over
a case, to award advance costs, and to suspend a declaration of invalidity more principled and purposive.

I. REMEDIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE CHARTER
1. The Importance of Remedial Discretion
Remedial discretion is an important feature of the Charter. Section
24 was placed in the Charter in no small part because Canadian courts
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refused to exercise discretion under both the Canadian Bill of Rights11
and the common law to award remedies such as the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence12 or a stay of proceedings.13 Remedial discretion is specifically provided in section 24(1) of the Charter, which
contemplates such remedies being ordered “as the court considers appropriate and just.” As McIntyre J. observed in R. v. Mills,14 “[i]t is
difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider and
less fettered discretion. It is impossible to reduce this wide discretion to
some sort of binding formula for general application in all cases, and it
is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide discretion.”
More recently, McLachlin C.J. has similarly observed that section 24(1)
“appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to craft
remedies for violations of Charter rights.”15
On its face, section 52(1) of the Constitution Act mandates that unconstitutional laws will be struck down, but the reference to declaring
such laws of no force and effect “to the extent of the inconsistency”
introduces considerable discretion as to whether the appropriate remedy
is a blanket declaration of invalidity or whether a less drastic remedy
such as reading down, reading in, exemption, or severance would better
accord with the purposes of the impugned legislation and the Charter.16
Finally, the ability of courts to suspend a declaration of invalidity introduces another layer of discretion into the exercise of remedial decisionmaking under section 52(1).17

11

R. v. Hogan, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272.
13
R. v. Osborn, [1971] S.C.R. 184.
14
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 965, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39.
15
R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, at para. 18, [2001] S.C.J. No. 79.
16
Schachter v. Canada, supra, note 5. On this jurisprudence, see my Constitutional
Remedies in Canada (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2003) at ch. 14.
17
Interestingly, the South African Constitution, which has borrowed from the Canadian experience of suspending declarations of invalidity, clearly contemplates considerable
discretion in deciding whether to suspend a declaration of invalidity and in determining the
terms on which the suspension will be made. See South Africa Constitution, s. 172(1), which
provides:
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court —
a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and
b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including —
12
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2. Types of Remedial Discretion
Although remedial discretion seems at one level to be an undeniable
fact under the Charter, it is one that requires justification. The ambiguous nature of the trial judge’s remedial discretion is demonstrated in the
jurisprudence concerning appellate deference to issues of remedial
choice. Appellate courts will not generally evaluate a remedy on a de
novo basis. At the same time, they will intervene if the trial judge erred
in setting out the relevant legal test, was clearly wrong, or gave reasons
that were “so brief and conclusionary that it is difficult to say whether
other errors were made.”18 This year, the Court has further emphasized
the need for qualified appellate deference to a trial judge’s exercise of
remedial discretion. In Buhay,19 the Court deferred to the trial judge’s
decision to exclude evidence under section 24(2) on the basis that it was
not “unreasonable nor based upon an error or a misapprehension of the
applicable law.” In Doucet-Boudreau,20 the majority emphasized that in
evaluating section 24(1) remedies “[r]eviewing courts … must show
considerable deference to trial judges’ choice of remedy, and should
refrain from using hindsight to perfect a remedy. A reviewing court
should only interfere where the trial judge has committed an error of law
or principle.”
Recent debates among scholars of private law remedies about the
degree to which equitable remedies are discretionary or rule-based may
be helpful in clarifying the nature of remedial discretion, as well as the
controversial nature of the enterprise. Professor Peter Birks has argued
that remedial decision-making must be ruled-based in order to promote
certainty in the law and accord with the ideal of the rule of law.21

1)

an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity;
and
2) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on
any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
18
R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at para. 84, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49.
19
Supra, note 8, at para. 48.
20
Supra, note 1, at para. 87.
21
Peter Birks, “Rights, Wrongs and Remedies” (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 1, at 36-37; Peter
Birks, “Three Kinds of Objections to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 W. Aust. L. Rev.
1; Darryn Jenson, “The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism” (2003) Sing. J. of
Legal Studies 178.
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Others, however, defend so-called “discretionary remedialism”22 on the
basis of the impossibility of avoiding the need for judgment and flexibility in remedial decision-making. Although proponents of rule-based
remedial decision-making raise the spectre of unfettered remedial decision-making, many of the advocates of discretionary remedialism support a more restrained and less positivistic form of discretion. They
advocate what Ronald Dworkin describes as a “weak” form of discretion that is governed by legal principles as opposed to a “strong” form
of discretion that applies “when a judge runs out of rules.” Professor
Dworkin sees principles as “standards that reasonable men can interpret
in different ways”23 and contrasts them with rules that, in his view, have
a more self-executing or categorical nature. Multiple principles can be
relevant to a judicial decision and must be weighed by the judges,
whereas a legal rule as conceived by Dworkin either applies or does not.
To be sure, Dworkin’s distinctions between weak and strong forms of
discretion and between rules and principles are controversial, and they
may discount the need for interpretation in applying rules. Nevertheless,
as will be seen, they provide a helpful guide to conceptualizing remedial
discretion under the Charter.
(a) Strong Remedial Discretion
The idea of strong discretion is based on a positivistic sense that at
some point the rules run out, and this gives the judge unconstrained
freedom to make a decision by exercising discretion. Such a discretion
seems anomalous in a legal regime committed to the rule of law and the
protection of rights. Peter Birks, for example, has argued that “the whole
point of the rule of law” is to avoid rule on the basis of “the wills and
whims of a person or a group of people. The blessings of this commitment [to the rule of law] have been overlooked by the discretionary
remedialists who suddenly suppose that the judges should be the one

22
Simon Evans, “Defending Discretionary Remedialism” (2001) 23 Sydney L. Rev.
463, at 480ff; Patricia Loughlan, “No Right to a Remedy? An Analysis of Judicial Discretion
in the Imposition of Equitable Remedies” (1989) 17 Melb. L. Rev. 132.
23
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1977), at 69, 34.
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group answerable only to God.”24 To be sure, the idea of strong discretion sits uneasily with the ideals of the rule of law and the concept that
where there is a right, there is a remedy.25 At the same time, it is perhaps
unfair to castigate strong discretion as simply a matter of will and whim.
Remedial discretion is, at the end of the day, exercised by judges who
are constrained by their institutional role to act in an impartial manner.
A judge who exercises strong discretion is not necessarily immune from
criticism that the discretion has been exercised unfairly or unwisely.26
As will be seen, there are some areas of constitutional remedies that
at present seem to be exercised on the basis of strong discretion. Examples might include the discretion of a judge not to award an equitable
remedy27 or the discretion of a provincial superior court to decline jurisdiction in a case which could be heard by the Federal Court.28 Some
might also argue that suspended or delayed declarations of invalidity
have become a matter of pure discretion as courts, including the Supreme Court, have ignored the restriction set out in Schachter v. Canada29 on their use and have employed them in a wide variety of cases.
Less controversially, the choice of the period for which the suspension
will apply also seems to be a matter of pure or strong discretion. Sometimes the Supreme Court suspends a declaration of invalidity for 6
months, sometimes for 12 months, and sometimes for 18 months. In
2003, the Supreme Court suspended declarations of invalidity for a
period of 12 months in two cases,30 but for 6 months in a third case,31

24

Peter Birks, “Three Kinds of Objections to Discretionary Remedialism” supra, note
21, at 15.
25
Professor Birks argues that “discretionary remedialism cannot allow the plaintiff to
have rights. To make room for the discretion it has to reduce the plaintiff to a supplicant seeking
the exercise if a discretion in his favour. He cannot be heard to demand rights.” Id., at 13.
26
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 33.
27
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 195 D.L.R. (4th)
135, [2003] O.J. No. 4804 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2001), 158 O.A.C. 199
(note). But for a discussion of the basis on which this discretion should be exercised and the
need to relate the exercise of the discretion to legal principles, see my “Remedies in Aboriginal Litigations” in Magnet & Dorey, eds., Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 2003), at 323-26.
28
Reza v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 49.
29
Supra, note 5.
30
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), supra, note 4; Figueroa v. Canada
(Attorney General), supra, note 4.
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with no rationale given to explain the difference. Generally, no reasons
are given to explain the choice of time.32 One of the hallmarks of pure
discretion is that it need not be accompanied by reasons. Reasons are
generally seen as means to relate a legal decision to some applicable
rule or principle, and are superfluous when there are no such standards.
(b) Rule-Based Remedial Discretion
Rule-based discretion can be seen as an (over) reaction to the dangers of pure or strong discretion. The idea behind rule-based discretion
is that appellate courts should formulate rules that will outline the circumstances in which trial judges should exercise their remedial discretion. Dworkin defines rules as “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion.”
This means that “if the facts a rule stipulates are given” and the rule is
validly on point then “the answer it supplies must be accepted.”33 His
example of a rule is that a will must be witnessed by three persons to be
valid. Dworkin may lean towards something of a caricature of rules, but
as will be seen, there are some examples of courts taking such a seemingly categorical approach to issues of remedial discretion.
One value of rules is that they can promote certainty about the law,
provided that it is clear what rule applies, and the judge is faithful to the
result required by the rule. Unlike strong discretion, the application of
rules also often invites and requires reasons from the judge. The reasons, however, will be focused on whether the conditions precedent to
the rule apply or perhaps whether a conflicting rule applies. In some
cases, reasoning about whether a rule applies will cause greater reflection about the purposes and principles that are at stake, but often reasons
will end at the issue of whether the case at hand is sufficiently analogous to the cases contemplated by the rule that the rule should apply.
As will be seen, there are some areas of constitutional remedies that
seem at present to be based on rules. One example would be the original
rule in Schachter34 which suggests that suspended or delayed declarations

31

Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, supra, note 4.
But see Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 203, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24 for an explanation of an 18-month delay.
33
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 24.
34
Supra, note 5.
32
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of invalidity are extraordinary and should be reserved to cases in which
an immediate declaration of invalidity would threaten the rule of law or
public safety, or deprive someone of a benefit that is only unconstitutional in the sense that it is underinclusive. When courts apply this rule,
they generally focus on whether the case at hand is analogous to the
three categories presented by the rule in Schachter. As mentioned
above, the Stillman35 test for the exclusion of evidence can also be seen
as rule-based in the sense that it requires the exclusion of evidence that
satisfies the definition of conscriptive evidence, sometimes defined as
statements and bodily substances obtained unconstitutionally from the
accused. Again, reasons in such cases will usually focus on whether
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the particular case satisfies the
definition of conscriptive evidence. If it does, it is excluded without
much discussion of the underlying rationale or principle that explains or
justifies the rule.36
Resistance to inflexible rules may produce a situation that gravitates
towards strong discretion. The reason for this is that rules often focus on
particular factual conditions precedent and not the underlying reasons
why the conditions should have those consequences. Both strong discretion and rule-based discretion can be united by relative inattention to
underlying principles. This may explain why the Schachter rules have
been both unstable and unpredictable. Either judges determine whether
the case at hand fits into the three examples provided by the Court, as
did the Ontario Court of Appeal in the gay marriage case,37 or the judge
ignores the rule and decides, as a matter of strong discretion, and often
without any real reasons, either to suspend or not suspend the declaration of invalidity.

35

Supra, note 8.
For an argument that a definitional approach to conscriptive evidence can discount
the importance of the underlying principle of whether the evidence was unobtained through
an unfair process of self-incrimination see my Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra,
note 16, at 10.1210-10.1225, and my “Here We Go Again: Reviving the Real Evidence
Distinction under Section 24(2)” (1999) 42 C.L.Q. 397.
37
Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Halpern v. Ontario; Halpern v.
Toronto (City)) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529, [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (C.A.).
36
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(c) Principled Remedial Discretion
An alternative to either strong or rule-based remedial discretion is
principled remedial discretion. Dworkin’s account of principles suggests
that they are more general and in some ways controversial than rules.
Dworkin’s theory is best known for its distinction between rights-based
principles and collective policies and the demanding obligation to seek
right answers in hard cases. What is perhaps less well-known is his
sense that there are multiple principles and policies that can be considered in a particular case, and that judges must decide the weight of any
principle in a particular case. Dworkin has a more modest description of
principles, not as full-blown right answers, but as something “which
officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or another.” On this account, a judge is “required to assess all of the competing and conflicting principles” that
bear on a case and “make a resolution of these principles rather than
identifying one among others as ‘valid’.”38 This account of multiple
principles, though perhaps not entirely consistent with Dworkin’s ultimate aspiration for a right answer through adjudication, allows for a
more meaningful distinction between rule-based and principled remedial
discretion. It opens up the space for judges to consider multiple principles — such as the need for an effective remedy and the need to respect
the institutional role of the judiciary — when deciding questions of
remedies without attempting to formulate particular rules about the
circumstances in which one of these principles will have greater weight
or when particular remedies should be ordered.
The idea that even the exercise of remedial discretion under the
Charter can be principled is a compelling aspiration. It promises that
something of the same methodology that is applied to determining the
content of the rights and the justification of any limit on the right can
also be applied to remedial decision-making. In this sense, it unites the
process of determining rights and remedies. At the same time, it allows
us to make sense of the fact that trial judges have a discretion to formulate appropriate and just remedies in particular circumstances.

38

Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 26, 72.
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There are some areas of constitutional remedies that gravitate towards a principled approach to Charter remedies. In R. v. Gamble,39
Wilson J. stressed the connections between the process of interpreting
rights and devising remedies when she stated that “[a] purposive approach should, in my view, be applied to the administration of Charter
remedies as well as to the interpretation of Charter rights….Charter
relief should not be denied or ‘displaced by overly rigid rules’.” At
various junctures, the Supreme Court has stressed that remedies should
vindicate the purposes of particular Charter rights. In Osborne v. Canada,40 the Court expressed the importance of selecting a remedy that
would vindicate the values of freedom of expression. In Schachter v.
Canada,41 the Court indicated that “[t]he absolute unavailability of reading in would mean that the standards developed under the Charter
would have to be applied in certain cases in ways which would derogate
from the deeper social purposes of the Charter.” In that case, the Court
took a principled approach to the remedial choice between reading in
and a declaration of invalidity by basing it on the general principles of
the need to respect the role of the legislature and the purposes of the
Charter. To be sure, these general principles require further interpretation and application, but they provide a better and more general framework than the rule-based approach taken in Schachter to the separate
question of when a declaration of invalidity should be suspended.
A principled approach to the exercise of remedial discretion might
be impractical if it demanded that only one principle was relevant to any
particular exercise of remedial discretion. Fortunately, it is easier to
accept the idea of multiple and competing purposes and policies than it
is multiple and competing rules. Once it is accepted that a principled
approach can implicate more than one principle, it is possible to see the
Court’s frequent attention to the need to respect the proper role of legislatures, the executive and the judiciary, to balance competing interests,
and to provide effective remedies as a principled approach to remedial
decision-making.42 A principled and purposive approach to the exercise
39

[1988] 2 S.C.R. 595, at 641, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87.
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, [1991] S.C.J. No. 45.
41
Supra, note 5, at 701.
42
Schachter v. Canada, id.; Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342. On the multiple
purposes and principles that courts consider when ordering constitutional remedies, see my
Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra, note 16, at ch. 2.
40
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of remedial discretion does not necessarily mean that the court will
select the remedy that maximizes the relevant right in all cases. Rather it
requires that judges consider all of the relevant and at times competing
principles and attempt to order the best remedy possible. It also requires
that judges attempt to justify their selection of remedies in a manner that
fits with the general interpretative approach taken to determining the
scope of rights and reasonable limits under the Charter.
3. Summary
The three approaches to the exercise of remedial discretion outlined
above can be seen as a spectrum.
Rule

Principle

Strong Discretion

A rule-based and strong discretion approach are set at the opposite
ends of the spectrum because they recognize the extremes of either
control or freedom of the trial judge, but they also are united by their
relevant neglect of the issue of general principles. As will be suggested
below, a frequent reaction to the inflexibility of rule-based discretion is
to exercise strong discretion by ignoring the rules. The spectrum approach is also helpful because it demonstrates that particular decisions
may lie on the borderline of the categories. For example, a rule-based
approach may lean towards principle to the extent that interpretation and
application of the rules engages broader and more general questions
about the purposes of the rules. A principled approach may lean towards
strong discretion to the extent that it emphasizes appellate deference to
the trial judge’s choice of remedy.
In the remaining parts of this paper, I will examine some recent remedial decisions made by the Supreme Court. At first, I will describe
the decision made by the Court and later I will evaluate the decision
with reference to the above categories of strong, rule-based, and principled remedial discretion. In many cases, the question of whether the
decision amounts to a principled and purposive approach to remedial
decision-making could be the subject of reasonable disagreement. Nevertheless my hope is that remedial decision-making can be improved by
attempting to avoid the excesses of, on the one hand, strong and unfettered discretion and, on the other hand, discretion that is mechanically
guided by self-applying rules. At the same time, I recognize that multiple
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principles are usually in play when a court fashions an appropriate and
just remedy. Judges will have to use good judgment in order to reconcile
these multiple and sometimes competing principles into a remedial
decision that demonstrates awareness of all the relevant factors, and
attempts to justify the exercise of remedial discretion in light of these
factors.

II. DOUCET-BOUDREAU AND THE DISCRETION TO ORDER
INJUNCTIONS AND RETAIN JURISDICTION
1. The Judgment
In the case of Doucet-Boudreau, the trial judge concluded that Nova
Scotia had violated its requirement to provide minority language facilities in five regions of the province. The evidence suggested that between
1982 and 1997, the Department of Education had not accorded a priority
to section 23 of the Charter or the assimilation of the Francophone minority when assessing priorities for new schools. The trial judge required that the respondents use their “best efforts” to comply with
various deadlines in each of the regions and indicated that “[t]he Court
shall retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Respondents respecting
the Respondents’ compliance with this Order. The Respondents shall
report to this Court on March 23, 2001 at 9:30 a.m., or on such other
date as the Court may determine.”43 Several such reporting sessions
were held in which the Department of Education, upon the judge’s request, submitted affidavits detailing progress in school construction, and
the other parties were also given an opportunity to adduce evidence.
The Crown appealed only the retention of jurisdiction in the case
and in a 2:1 decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the trial
judge had erred in retaining jurisdiction after he was functus officio.
Justice of Appeal Flinn, for the majority, distinguished the Manitoba
Language Reference44 on the basis that the trial judge in this case had
not left any issues, such as the deadlines for compliance, outstanding.
43

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), supra, note 1, at para. 7.
Reference re Language Rights Under S. 23 of Manitoba Act, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 36, in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) (2001), 194
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He also stressed that there was no specific statutory authorization for the
retention of jurisdiction, and expressed concerns that the trial judge
acted as an administrator as opposed to a judge at the reporting sessions
and that this may strain “harmonious relations”45 between the judicial
and other branches of government. Justice of Appeal Freeman in dissent
would have upheld the trial judge’s exercise of remedial discretion,
concluding that it was a “creative blending of declaratory and injunctive
relief with a means of mediation.”46 In his view, the trial judge’s remedy
had the practical benefit of allowing a judge familiar with the issues to
“expedite implementation of the order in a variety of ways, not least of
which being provision of a means of mediating disputes inevitable in
carrying out the complex requirements of the order.”47
The Supreme Court decided 5:4 to uphold the trial judge’s remedy.
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour, for the majority, stressed the important
role of provincial superior courts and their inherent jurisdiction to award
remedies, a power that “cannot be strictly limited by statutes or rules of
the common law.”48 This power was not, however, absolute or unreviewable because it “must be read in harmony with the rest of our Constitution.”49 To this end, a remedy should be effective and meaningful
having regard to the right and its violation; it “must strive to respect the
relationships with and separation of functions among the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary”;50 it must call on “the function and powers
of the court”;51 and finally, it must also be “fair to the party against
whom the order is made.”52 The Court concluded that the trial judge’s
remedy was designed to prevent further procedural delay in vindicating
rights long denied to the minority. The Court also noted that the remedy
respected the role of the different institutions because it left the
“detailed choices of means largely to the executive.”53 Although more
45

Doucet-Boudreau, id., at paras. 50-52.
Id., at para. 70.
47
Id., at para. 62. On the important role of mediation in cases of ongoing structural relief, see Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281.
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Supra, note 1, at para. 51.
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Id., at para. 50.
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Id., at para. 56.
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Id., at para. 57.
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Id., at para. 58.
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precision may have been desirable, the remedy was not fundamentally
unfair to the government because it was not unduly vague and it could
be appealed. Finally, the majority stressed that appellate courts “must
show considerable deference to trial judges’ choice of remedy, and
should refrain from using hindsight to perfect a remedy. A reviewing
court should only interfere where the trial judge has committed an error
of law or principle.”54
In a judgment by LeBel and Deschamps JJ., the minority of the
Court concluded that the trial judge had erred by breaching the separation of powers; by retaining jurisdiction after he was functus; and by
making an order that was so vague as to be procedurally unfair. Specifically, the minority held that if the trial judge was prepared to make
further orders at the reporting session, he violated the separation of
powers by entering into the realm of “administrative supervision and
decision making.”55 It stressed that such a managerial role did not accord with the institutional capabilities of the judiciary or with “the Canadian tradition of mutual respect between the judiciary and the
institutions that are the repository of democratic will.”56 If anything, the
minority was even more critical of what the trial judge did if, as accepted by the majority of the Court, he was only holding reporting sessions and not contemplating additions or amendments to his original
order. In that case, LeBel and Deschamps JJ., asserted that the trial
judge was acting in a “political”57 manner akin to the pressure that an
opposition party places on a government. Instead of the reporting sessions, which they argued contemplated “an inappropriate, ongoing supervisory and investigative role,”58 the trial judge should have waited
for the applicants to have commenced an application for contempt of
court for violating his remedial order. The availability of the contempt
sanction in the minority’s view ensured that the trial judge’s remedy
would have been effective without the retention of jurisdiction or the
reporting requirement.

54
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Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 125.
Id., at para. 125.
Id., at para. 128.
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2. The Judgment and the Three Models of Discretion
Doucet-Boudreau is an interesting and important case in no small
part because both the majority and the minority focus on many of the
important issues of principle that animate the exercise of remedial discretion under the Charter. For the majority, the principle with the greatest weight was the need to provide a remedy that was effective and
meaningful for the applicants. They advocated a purposive approach to
remedies that
requires at least two things. First, the purpose of the right being
protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive remedies.
Second, the purpose of the remedies provision must be promoted:
courts must craft effective remedies.59

The idea that remedies must be responsive and effective are broad goals
or principles; they do not produce self-executing results in the manner
of rules. The majority’s focus on the right being protected and the context of the violation also explains why it spends considerably more time
than the minority judgment in discussing the purposes of section 23 of
the Charter and the particular nature of the violation caused by continued governmental neglect of the right to minority language education.
The majority did not view the principle of full and effective remedies as the only principle at stake in exercising remedial discretion under section 24(1) of the Charter. The competing principles can be
grouped into two categories. The first is the need to respect the proper
relationship with other parts of government with the concomitant concern of ensuring that the remedy remains suited to the judicial function.
It is significant to the majority that the trial judge was exercising the
constitutionally protected jurisdiction of a provincial superior court.
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour concluded that statutory and common law
rules limiting the remedial powers of courts, as well as the jurisprudence
that determines whether inferior tribunals have jurisdiction over a remedy requested under section 24(1) of the Charter, do not apply to the
exercise of discretion by provincial superior courts under section 24(1)
of the Charter.60 The majority takes much less of a rule-based approach
59
60
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118

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

than the minority to the question of whether the remedy is compatible
with the separation of powers. It warns that there is no “bright line”
separating judicial, executive, and legislative “functions in all cases.”61
The restraint of requiring a judicial remedy means not that courts may
never exercise a legislative or administrative function, but rather that
“[i]t will not be appropriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions
and functions for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited.”62 The majority signals that the principle of effective and responsive remedies will have greater weight than the principle of respecting
institutional roles when it makes the evocative statement that
“[d]eference ends … where the constitutional rights that the courts are
charged with protecting begin.”63
The second competing principle is that constitutional remedies must
be fair to the government. The majority seems to concede that the trial
judge’s remedy could have been fairer to the government had it been
more specific about what was required. It indicates that the parties could
have been given more guidance as to what would happen at the reporting session, and a specified timetable. In the end, however, the majority
concludes that “reporting order was not vaguely worded so as to render
it invalid.”64 In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies heavily on
the concept of appellate deference to the discretion of a trial judge who
is “not required to identify the single best remedy, even if that were
possible.”65 An emphasis on appellate deference, and especially the idea
that even the trial judge does not have a duty to seek the best remedy
possible, moves from the realm of principled remedial discretion in the
direction of strong discretion.
The majority’s decision on the fairness point could in my view have
been improved by more focus on context, principle, and alternative
remedies. The remedial environment was complex and dynamic because
it involved five different school regions in the province, and a new government had just come into power. Given the minority’s extraordinary
criticism of their colleagues as sanctioning a “political” remedy, I hasten
to add that the change of government is not relevant in a partisan politi61
62
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cal sense, but because of functional concerns about delays that can result
from power transitions. The majority also underestimates that the trial
judge did indeed establish target deadlines for the construction of
French language schools in all five regions. The fairness of the trial
judge’s remedy is in my view best revealed by the fact that the reporting
sessions were an alternative to waiting until a deadline had been missed
and then holding a contempt hearing. The government and its officials
were not in jeopardy at the reporting sessions of being found in contempt and this speaks to the fairness of the less-structured procedure
used by the trial judge. In general, remedies will be better justified by
consideration of the relevant principles and contexts and not by reliance
on appellate deference. Although appellate courts should recognize that
there may be a range of reasonable remedial choices that can be made
without error, they should not send a signal to trial judges that they are
not obliged to attempt, however difficult that may be, to devise the “single best remedy.” Remedial discretion under the Charter should not be
conceived of a matter in which a judge “has no duty to decide one way
or the other, but rather a permission … to decide either way.”66
On the spectrum of discretion outlined in the first part of this paper,
the majority roots itself in principle, but leans more toward strong than
to ruled-based discretion. When appellate courts consider remedial decision-making, it may well be best for them to err on the side of strong
rather than rule-based discretion because of the unforeseen circumstances that may be encountered by trial judges and the comparative
advantages that trial judges have in devising remedies because of their
familiarity with all the evidence, the parties, and local circumstances.67
As suggested above, however, this should not be taken as an endorsement of strong discretion by trial judges and it does not relieve trial
judges of their obligation to consider all the relevant legal principles and
give full reasons to explain their decisions. Trial judges should aim at
ordering the best remedy and one that is supported by consideration and
weighing of the relevant purposes and principles.
The minority in Doucet-Boudreau, like the majority, focuses on the
principles of effective remedies, respect for the separation of powers,
66
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and procedural fairness in its evaluation of the trial judge’s remedy.
Although there is obvious disagreement about the contours and weight
of these principles among the nine judges, it is a positive sign of the
growing maturity of remedial jurisprudence that all nine judges agree
that the remedy should be evaluated in relation to the same broad
principles.
The minority gives considerably less weight than the majority to the
principle of effective and meaningful remedies. The judgment of LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. starts with the declaration that “the devil is in the
details” and proceeds through a discussion of the drafting of the order in
relation to the principle of procedural fairness, and various restraints on
the appropriate role of the judiciary including the doctrine of functus
officio. The issue of the effectiveness of the trial judge’s remedy is addressed only towards the end of their judgment where they assert that
“[i]f the claimants felt that the government was not complying with any
part of the order, then they could have brought an application for contempt.”68 One problem with reliance on the possibility of contempt
applications to ensure an effective remedy is, on the facts of the case, it
is not clear that they were available. There was some ambiguity about
whether the trial judge’s remedy constituted a declaration or an injunction. Moreover as the majority conceded and as the minority itself
stressed, there was some concern about the vagueness of the “best efforts” order. In Little Sisters,69 the majority of the Court emphasized the
need for precision should injunctions, including structural injunctions,
be used. Given the need for a clear order and breach of that order before
a person or an organization can fairly be found in contempt of court, it is
doubtful that the trial judge’s remedy could actually have been enforced
through contempt. If the trial judge’s order was too vague to be enforced
through contempt, then it is illogical and unconvincing for the minority
to claim that the availability of contempt would have made the trial
judge’s order effective without the reporting requirements. In any event,
the minority in my view did not devote sufficient attention to the fundamental principle that constitutional remedies must be effective and
meaningful.
68

Id., at paras. 91, 136, 143.
Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66.
69

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Principled Remedial Discretion

121

The minority’s discussion of the principle of the separation of powers and limits of judicial power leans heavily in the direction of a rule
that would preclude the use of supervisory jurisdiction and structural
injunctions. This conclusion is surprising given that two of the four
judges in the minority — Major and Binnie JJ. — seemed in Binnie J.’s
majority judgment in Little Sisters v. Canada70 to leave open the possibility that structural injunctions may be “helpful” in the appropriate
case. In Doucet-Boudreau, the minority comes quite close to articulating
a rule that would prohibit such structural relief when it stated:
In our view, if a court intervenes, as here, in matters of administration
properly entrusted to the executive, it exceeds its proper sphere and
thereby breaches the separation of powers. By crossing the boundary
between judicial acts and administrative oversight, it acts
illegitimately and without jurisdiction. Such a crossing of the
boundary cannot be characterized as relief that is “appropriate and just
in the circumstances” within the meaning of section 24(1) of the
Charter.
…
By purporting to be able to make subsequent orders, the trial judge
would have assumed a supervisory role which included administrative
functions that properly lie in the sphere of the executive. These
functions are beyond the capacities of courts.
…
the executive should after a judicial finding of a breach, retain
autonomy in administering government policy that conforms with the
Charter.71

To be sure this conclusion is rooted in the minority’s interpretation
of an important principle, namely the separation of powers and the limits of the judicial function. In some other parts of the judgment this idea
is also hedged in by qualifiers such as the statement that “courts should,
as a general rule, avoid interfering in the management of public

70
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administration.”72 Nevertheless, the minority judgment leans towards an
absolute rule against structural injunctions.
Some principles may be strong enough to justify an absolute rule,
but in many other contexts, the Court has been shy about articulating
any absolute rule. For example, the Court has even refused to articulate
an absolute rule that extradition to face the death penalty or deportation
to face torture will violate the Constitution.73 Given this, can the more or
less absolute rule proposed by the minority against structural injunctions
be justified? In my view, it cannot. As discussed above, the minority
gives inadequate weight to the principle of effective remedies and assumes that contempt citations will be sufficient to ensure government
compliance with any court order. One problem with this assumption is
that it discounts the inherently complex and polycentric nature of public
law litigation. The minority operates on the assumption that a failure to
comply with a court order will be the result of deliberate disobedience
that can be cured by fining the government or jailing the responsible
officials for contempt. The problem is that a failure to comply with
constitutional standards can be caused by a wide range of factors including incompetence and unforeseen circumstances. For example, what
would have happened to the deadlines in the trial judge’s order if there
had been a major public sector or construction strike in Nova Scotia? In
such circumstances it would have been unfair to have fined the government or its officials for factors outside their control. It would, however,
have been appropriate and just for the trial judge to revisit the order in
light of the changed circumstances and to have issued revised and supplementary orders. The Supreme Court has itself issued such supplementary orders in response to new information about the difficulties of
translating Manitoba’s laws into French.74 It has also extended transition
periods or periods of a suspended declaration of invalidity in light of
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changed circumstances.75 The minority does not deal adequately with
this experience and ignores the analogous supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the court in a range of private law matters, a point that the
majority stresses.76 The minority’s decision is based on a narrow and
absolute understanding of the separation of powers that does not fit
either previous constitutional cases or the traditional role of courts of
equity.
Another factor that undermines the minority judgment is that it does
not consider how other principles may affect its rule against the retention of supervisory jurisdiction and structural injunctions. As discussed
above, such a rule sits uneasily with the principle of effective and responsive remedies. In addition, it sits uneasily with the concern about
preserving a proper relationship between courts and governments. As
the majority notes, the alternative remedy relied upon by the minority,
the contempt citation, is in tension with the traditional relationship between Canadian courts and governments. Reliance on contempt citations
could cause greater harm to the relationship between courts and governments than the retention of jurisdiction and the conduct of reporting
sessions.
The minority’s opinion well demonstrates a weakness of a rulebased approach. Once a rule applies, it is self-executing without attention to competing rules or principles. In contrast, as Dworkin suggests, a
principled approach will lend itself more easily to judicial consideration
of competing principles and policies. Again, reasonable people may
disagree about the respective weight attached to the competing principles, but a judicial opinion will be more persuasive and have greater
75
Reference re Provincial Court Act, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, supp.
reasons [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3, [1998] S.C.J. No. 10, supp. reasons [1998] 2 S.C.R. 443, [1998]
S.C.J. No. 92; R. v . Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, supp. reasons [1997] 2
S.C.R. 117, [1997] S.C.J. No. 80, supp. reasons [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1008, [1997] S.C.J. No. 114;
R. v. Cobham, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 360, [1994] S.C.J. No. 76. On the considerable confusion
caused by these cases, see Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Putting the Past Behind Us?
Prospective Judicial and Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.
(2d) 205, at 214-25.
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legitimacy if it appears to have considered all of the relevant competing
principles. In my view, the minority’s opinion leans excessively towards
a rule against judicial supervision without adequate consideration of
how such a rule will affect the principles of effective and meaningful
remedies or the maintenance of a proper relation between the court and
governments.
In the end, it is a positive sign that all the judges in DoucetBoudreau root their decisions in the principles of effective remedies,
respect for institutional role, and procedural fairness. Moreover it should
not be surprising that reasonable people will disagree about the application of these principles or the proper weight to be given to them. The
majority’s opinion could have been improved by curbing a tendency to
move in the direction of strong discretion. Although there is a need for
appellate courts to defer to a trial judge’s ability to determine what remedy is appropriate and just in all the circumstances, care should be taken
not to suggest that trial judges do not have a legal duty both to consider
all the relevant principles and to search for the best remedy. At the same
time, the minority opinion moves even more than the majority judgment
away from a focus on the relevant remedial principles. The minority
strays not toward strong discretion, but rather in the direction of rulebased discretion. Justices LeBel and Deschamps came very close to
articulating an absolute rule that would preclude trial judges from retaining supervisory jurisdiction and issuing structural injunctions. This
absolute rule does not fit with the remedial experience in both public
and private law including cases such as the Manitoba Language Reference77 in which the Supreme Court itself has retained jurisdiction and
modified its own orders. It also does not fit with the comparable experience of not only the United States, but many other countries including
India and South Africa, which have recognized the legitimacy of courts
retaining supervisory jurisdiction in constitutional cases.78 Most impor-
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tantly, from the perspective of the search for a principled approach to
the exercise of remedial discretion, an absolute rule against structural
injunctions pays inadequate attention to the principle of the need for
effective remedies.

III. OKANAGAN INDIAN BAND AND THE DISCRETION
TO AWARD ADVANCE COSTS
1. The Judgment
In British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian
Band,79 Aboriginal bands applied to a judge of the British Columbia
Supreme Court for an order of advance or interim costs. They wished to
argue that orders to stop them from logging violated their Aboriginal
title to the land and the right to log on the land, as authorized by their
tribal councils. The trial judge found that he had “a limited discretion in
appropriate circumstances to award interim costs” but this case “falls far
outside that area” in large part because of the risk of prejudging the
complex case which required a trial.80 He rejected arguments that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or a fiduciary duty approach required the award of advance costs. He expressed sympathy for the plight
of the impoverished bands who faced possible legal bills close to $1
million, and the hope that governments would supply funding or counsel
might take the case on a contingency basis.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the
basis that the trial judge had misjudged the nature of his discretion to
award advance costs and in particular had over-emphasized the danger
of prejudging the case. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge
that there was no section 35 Aboriginal right or fiduciary duty that required the payment of advance costs. At the same time, the Court of
Appeal indicated that these considerations were important background
factors that supported its conclusion that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the order of advance costs.81
79
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The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s order for advance
costs in a 6:3 decision. Justice LeBel, for the majority, related the present law on advance costs in family, trust, bankruptcy, and corporate
cases to a general principle, namely the need “to avoid unfairness by
enabling impecunious litigants to pursue meritorious claims with which
they would not otherwise be able to proceed.”82 He also examined how
this principle would be applied to public interest litigation. To this end,
he took notice of how courts in some Charter cases have departed from
the normal rule of costs following the event and have even on occasion
awarded costs to an unsuccessful Charter applicant.83
Justice LeBel formulated three conditions that should be present for
an award of interim costs in public interest litigation, namely:
1.

The party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for
the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the
issues to trial — in short, the litigation would be unable to
proceed if the order were not made.

2.

The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; that is, the
claim is at least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the
interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue the case to be
forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means.

3.

The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the
particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been
resolved in previous cases.84

He indicated that satisfaction of these three criteria would not automatically justify the award of advance costs. Trial judges still had a
discretion not to order advance costs. Justice LeBel provided some guidance for how this discretion should be exercised when he indicated that
care should be taken not to impose “an unfair burden” on “private litigants who may, in some ways, be caught in the crossfire of disputes
82
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which, essentially, involve the relationship between the claimants and
certain public authorities, or the effect of laws of general application.”85
The majority stressed that appellate courts should defer to the trial
judge’s exercise of discretion unless it was based on legal error or “a
palpable error” in factual assessment.86 In this case, the trial judge had
so erred by placing too much emphasis on a concern that advance costs
would create an appearance of prejudgment, and in concluding that
alternative forms of funding such as contingency fees were viable in the
circumstances. The Supreme Court determined that the advance costs
awarded by the Court of Appeal were appropriate.87
Justice Major wrote the dissent with the concurrence of Iacobucci
and Bastarache JJ. He stressed the existing common law rules that advance costs only would be awarded in marital, corporate, and trusts
case. He related these cases to “a presumption that the property that is
the subject of the dispute is to be shared in some way” and that a party
who receives an advance cost order “will win some award from the
other party.”88 This principle was much more narrowly conceived than
that of the majority and seems to merge with an even narrower rule
based on the examples of when advance costs have previously been
ordered under the common law. Justice Major also indicated that the
trial judge was correct to be concerned about prejudging the case and
“one may not presume that the Bands will establish even partial aboriginal title in the cases under appeal.”89 Finally, he concluded that “the
honour of the Crown is not at stake in this appeal” in part because “no
right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is implicated and
the matter involves the provincial Crown rather than the federal
Crown….”90
Justice Major criticized the majority for sanctioning what has been
described in the first part of this article as a strong discretion in trial
judges to award advance costs. He warned that there was not “any ascertainable standard or direction” for deciding when a public interest case
was “special enough” to merit an award of advance costs. He argued
85
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that appeals to the justice of the case were so vague that “[a] trial judge
can draw no direction from this proposal.”91 In his view, concerns about
access to justice should be left to legislative reform.
2. The Judgment and the Three Models of Discretion
Although it sets out three requirements for the order of advance
costs, the majority judgment in Okanagan Indian Band seems to avoid a
strict rule-based approach to the exercise of the discretion. The three
criteria required by the majority all relate to the overall principle of
access to justice that seems to lie at the root of the case. In other words,
access to justice would not be advanced if interim costs were ordered
when the litigation could occur without such orders, or if the claim was
frivolous or only of importance to the parties themselves. The majority’s
opinion could have been improved by more examination of the nature of
the applicant’s claims. Even if section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
or section 15 of the Charter do not require interim costs as a matter of
right, they may provide important background support or “constitutional
hints”92 that could help justify the award. The minority addresses the
section 35 question, but is pre-emptory in concluding that the honour of
the Crown is not engaged in this case and in error in asserting that there
can be no fiduciary relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples.93 An important way of making the exercise of discretion
more principled is for courts to pay attention to the purposes of the constitution. For example, the Court indicated in Schachter v. Canada94 that
the purposes of the Charter, particularly section 15, may support a reading in remedy in some cases. The majority’s opinion in Okanagan Indian Band could have been improved by more attention to the
underlying rights at stake as a means to give content its laudatory concern with facilitating access to justice.
One reason why LeBel J. may not have paid more attention to the
merits of the applicant’s claim to Aboriginal title may have been a
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concern about prejudging the merits, concerns that were stressed by
both the trial judge and Major J. in his dissent. This can be related to the
general concern about procedural fairness accepted as a relevant principle by both the majority and the minority in Doucet-Boudreau. Justice
LeBel’s examination of the policy purposes of cost awards in general
and the special nature of costs in public interest litigation, however,
provides some answers to these concerns. As Justice LeBel points out,
there is a growing recognition that costs are not mechanically or invariably tied to the cause, and that there may be many legitimate reasons
why a losing public interest litigant should not have to pay costs to a
successful governmental litigant (and in some cases may even be entitled to costs). In addition, Justice LeBel’s direction that judges address
the danger of private litigants being unfairly burdened with interim costs
also suggests that it will often be equitable to place such burdens on
governments who are in the best position to distribute the costs of access
to justice. More explicit discussion of such considerations should allow
a judge who awards interim costs in a public interest case to stress the
importance of allowing the claim to be heard regardless of whether at
the end of the day the claim is successful.
The fear that advance costs will unfairly prejudge the case against
the government can also be addressed by examining the principles that
guide judges when exercising their discretion to grant public interest
standing or hear moot cases.95 The emphasis in such cases is on the
importance of a decision on the merits, and not on whether the court’s
preliminary procedural decision prejudges the merits or prejudices the
governmental defendants. Courts make sure that a constitutional claim is
serious and has some merit before exercising their discretion, but this
does not mean that the claim is valid. Indeed, the parties in a number of
cases in which public interest standing has been granted have turned out
to be losers on the merits. In public interest standing cases, like advance
costs cases, courts ask themselves whether there is an alternative way
that the issue raised in the case can be litigated. An important principle
in both the public interest standing and mootness cases is that the actions of governments should not be immunized from review. A similar
95
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principle informs the discretion to award advance costs. When deciding
whether to exercise discretion to grant public interest standing, award
advance costs, or decide a moot case, there is a common focus on the
benefit of a decision on the merits to the public at large as opposed to
the particular litigant. Although the minority criticizes the court for
recognizing an open-ended discretion to award advance costs, there is
no reason to think that a manageable and principled jurisprudence cannot develop around advance costs, in much the same way as it has developed around the discretion to grant public interest standing or decide
moot cases.
A number of strategies are available to make the exercise of the discretion to award interim costs more principled. As suggested above,
more attention could be paid to the importance of the rights claimed by
the impecunious party. As with public interest standing and mootness,
the emphasis should be on the importance of hearing and deciding such
claims rather than on the question of whether the claims will in fact
succeed at trial. Justice LeBel emphasized that the presence of the three
criteria does not require a judge to award interim costs. Taken by itself
such a residual discretion would lend support to the minority’s concern
that the Court has recognized a strong and unguided discretion. At the
same time, Justice LeBel helpfully provided some guidance about how
the residual discretion should be exercised by raising concerns about
imposing unfair burdens on private litigants. This concern reaffirms the
value of allowing impecunious litigants to make serious claims against
governments. Another helpful factor is for the majority to stress the
importance of the trial judge giving full reasons to justify the decision
whether or not to award interim costs.96 A requirement for full reasons
can help ensure that principles will develop over time to guide the exercise of discretion, and that the discretion does not degenerate into a
strong form of discretion that can be exercised without reasons.

96
A requirement for reasons seems to be implicit in Justice LeBel’s statement that
“discretionary decisions are not completely insulated from review. An appellate court may
and should intervene where it finds that the trial judge has misdirected himself as to the
applicable law or made a palpable error in his assessment of the facts … the criteria for the
exercise of a judicial discretion are legal criteria, and their definition as well as a failure to
apply them or a misapplication of them raise questions of law which are subject to appellate
review.” British Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, supra, note 3, at para. 43.
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An emphasis on appellate deference to the exercise of discretion can
produce a situation in which the discretion becomes a strong form of
discretion that is resistant not only to appellate review but the application of legal principles. For example, the majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia
(Attorney General)97 upheld the award of “symbolic damages” of
$20,000 to parents who had established that their rights under section 15
of the Charter had been denied by the government’s refusal to provide
intensive behavioural therapy for their autistic children. Justice of Appeal Saunders stressed the breadth of the trial judge’s remedial discretion, even hinting that no damages might have been an appropriate
remedy because the government may have had a good faith immunity.
The result of this decision was that very little guidance was given to trial
judges and litigants concerning the still underdeveloped nature of the
Charter damage claim. It was not clear what, if any, degree of fault was
necessary to justify damages and how damages, including damages for
the violation of the constitutional right itself, should be calculated. In
contrast, Lambert J.A. in his dissent took a more principled approach in
that he attempted to outline the fault level required for damages under
section 24(1) of the Charter and the appropriate method of calculating
damages. To this end, he stressed that the Supreme Court’s 1997
decision in Eldridge v. British Columbia98 should have alerted the
government to the merit of the claim and that damages should be
available for “the losses suffered by the adult petitioners in the period
when those losses were attributable to the recalcitrance or inertia of the
Crown in the face of the Eldridge case and the commencement of these
proceedings.”99
Reasonable people might disagree with Lambert J.A.’s dissent, but
that is the point. His decision, unlike that of the majority, articulates
principles that can be debated and which can guide the exercise of remedial discretion. For example, some might argue along with the
petitioners, that damages should be available for even earlier losses in
order to compensate all of the damages attributable to the section 15
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(2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 411, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2258 (C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. granted (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vi.
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[1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86.
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Auton, supra, note 97, at para. 138.

132

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

damages.100 Others might argue that the government acted in good faith
and should not have to pay any damages or pay only damages from the
date of the trial judgment, making clear what section 15 of the Charter
entailed in terms of health care for autistic children.101 These are difficult issues that ideally will be addressed when the Supreme Court delivers its judgment in this case. My point is only that reliance on the
concept of appellate deference to the trial judge’s discretion may produce a situation in which courts fail to outline the principles that should
guide decisions to award either interim costs or Charter damages.
In his dissent in Okanagan Indian Band, Major J. rejected the idea
that access to justice should be an animating principle for the exercise of
the discretion to award interim costs. He argued that this would constitute a radical departure from the treatment of advance costs under the
common law and that it addresses questions best left for the legislature.
Despite the fact that Major J. is the only constant, there are remarkable
similarities between the approaches taken by the dissenters in Okanagan
Indian Band and Doucet-Boudreau. Both dissents rely on the existing
common law much more than the majority. The focus on common law
concepts, such as the functus doctrine in Doucet-Boudreau and the
common law jurisprudence on advance costs in Okanagan, leave the
dissenters in both cases vulnerable to criticisms that they are discounting
the importance of the public and constitutional law context. Both dissents take the position that courts are ill-suited to making polycentric
choices with distributional consequences. Both would counsel judicial
deference to the ability of the legislature and the executive to make such
decisions. Finally, both dissents gravitate towards a rule-based approach
to the exercise of discretion. As discussed above, the dissent in DoucetBoudreau would hedge in trial judges in a manner that makes retention
of jurisdiction or modification of remedies very difficult except in the
rule-based context of a contempt hearing. Justice Major, in his dissent,
relies heavily on the examples of cases where interim costs have been
100
For a decision suggesting an entitlement from the date of the enactment of s. 15 of
the Charter in a case where discrimination was authorized by legislation, see Hislop v. Canada (2004), 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465, [2004] O.J. No. 1867 (S.C.).
101
For cases articulating a good faith immunity, at least when the violation was authorized by statute, see Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405,
[2002] S.C.J. No. 13 and Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 91.
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previously awarded. The failure of the case at hand to fit into established categories would preclude the award of advance costs.
Justice Major’s concern that the majority has outlined a test that is
based on strong or unguided discretion has some merit. Judges applying
the decision can respond to these concerns by examining the importance
of hearing public interest claims, regardless of their ultimate merit, and
by exploring how the purposes of the particular right claimed may support the award of advance costs. In the Aboriginal rights context, there
is a strong argument that the nature of the right claimed and the relationship between governments and Aboriginal people may support the
awarding of interim costs. Although the British Columbia Court of
Appeal did not ground the advance cost order in section 35 or related
fiduciary claims, it did consider these as important background factors
that helped justify the order. Justice LeBel’s judgment, however, does
not discuss these background factors at any great length. In my view this
is unfortunate because attention to the purpose of the right claimed can
assist judges in exercising their discretion to award advance costs on a
more principled basis. There may be a concern that any exploration of
the right at the advance costs stage will raise concerns about prejudgment. This spectre can be dispelled by emphasizing the importance of
public interest claims being heard, regardless of whether they are ultimately rejected or accepted. Courts consider the seriousness and importance of the claim and the danger of immunizing governmental actions
from review when exercising their discretion to award public interest
standing or to hear moot cases without any serious objection that they
have unfairly prejudged the case.
In the end, Okanagan Indian Band is a more discordant and troubling case than Doucet-Boudreau. In the latter case, all the judges
agreed on the relevant principles while disagreeing on their application
and weight. In the former, the minority rejected the access to justice
principle that was central to the majority’s judgment recognizing a discretion to award advance costs in public interest litigation. At the same
time, there are interesting parallels between Okanagan Indian Band and
Doucet-Boudreau. The majority judgment in both cases can be defended
as being grounded in general principles of justice that run the risk of
degenerating into strong forms of discretion. The reasons given by trial
judges in the future will be crucial in determining whether this danger
can be avoided. In both cases, the exercise of discretion can be disciplined and improved by reflecting on the purposes of the Charter right at
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stake, as well as the appropriate role of the court. The minority judgments in both cases take a rule-based approach that stresses common
law restrictions and discounts the significance of the public and constitutional law context. The minority in Doucet-Boudreau discounts justice
concerns related to the need for effective remedies while the minority in
Okanagan Indian Band appears to reject concerns about access to justice altogether. Concerns about the limits of the judicial role loom large
in both dissents.

IV. DELAYED OR SUSPENDED DECLARATIONS OF INVALIDITY
1. The Judgments
As discussed in the first part of this article, section 52(1) does not
contemplate a discretion to suspend a declaration, but the Supreme
Court has exercised this power in over 15 cases.102 The Court’s most
extensive discussion of this discretion came in Schachter v. Canada103
where it stressed that delayed declarations of invalidity were an extraordinary remedy that allowed an unconstitutional state of affairs to persist
and interfered with the legislature by forcing a matter onto the legislative agenda. Drawing on the limited number of cases in which a suspended declaration of invalidity had been ordered to that date,104 Lamer
C.J. formulated the following “guidelines”:
Temporally suspending the declaration of invalidity to give Parliament
or the provincial legislature in question an opportunity to bring the
impugned legislation…into line with its constitutional obligations will
be warranted even where striking down has been deemed the most
appropriate option on the basis of one of the above criteria if:

102

Choudhry & Roach, “Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and Legislative Constitutional Remedies,” supra, note 75, at 253-54; Bruce Ryder, “Suspending the
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103
Supra, note 5, at paras. 81-82.
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3 and the criticisms of the categorical approach in my Constitutional Remedies in Canada,
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A. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its
place would pose a danger to the public;
B. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its
place would threaten the rule of law; or
C. the legislation was deemed unconstitutional because of
underinclusiveness rather than overbreadth, and therefore striking
down the legislation would result in the deprivation of benefits
from deserving persons without thereby benefitting the individual
whose rights have been violated.105

Although Lamer C.J. stated that these “guidelines” were not meant
as “hard and fast rules”, they are an exemplar of the model of rule-based
discretion outlined above. The Schachter guidelines are based on examples of instances when a suspended declaration of invalidity would be
appropriate. These examples are determinative in and of themselves.
Once a court finds that an immediate declaration of invalidity would
endanger the public or the rule of law, it is not realistic to explore any
question other than the length of the suspension. There is not much
discussion of the underlying rationales or principles that might explain
why a court should or should not suspend a declaration of invalidity.
The examples speak for themselves without much elaboration. The
categorical approach to when suspended declarations of invalidity are
appropriate in Schachter seems to ignore two of the main remedial principles that are articulated in that very decision to help guide the decision
whether to strike an unconstitutional law or save it by a reading in remedy. Those general principles are attention to the purposes of the Charter
and the role of the legislature. With respect to the former, the Court says
little about how a suspended declaration relates to the purposes of the
Charter or the need to ensure that the successful Charter applicant receives an effective remedy. Chief Justice Lamer seemed to reject the
relevance of the principle of proper institutional function when he stated
that “the question whether to delay the application of a declaration of
nullity should…turn not on considerations of the role of the courts and
the legislature, but rather on considerations listed earlier relating to the
effect of an immediate declaration on the public.”106
105
106
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Since the Schachter guidelines were articulated in 1992, the Supreme Court has at times ignored them, often suspending declarations of
invalidity without attempting to assimilate them into the three categories. This trend continued in 2003 as the Court suspended declarations
of invalidity for 12 months in both Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)107 and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)108 and for 6
months in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin.109
The Court adverted to the Schachter guidelines in Trociuk as it concluded that an immediate declaration of invalidity would have the same
effect as the nullification of underinclusive benefits because it would
deprive mothers of the benefit of being able to make legitimate exclusions of the father’s name on their children’s birth certificates. Similarly
in Martin, the Court reasoned that a suspended declaration of invalidity
“would preserve the limited benefits of the current program until an
appropriate legislative response to chronic pain can be implemented.”110
In Figueroa,111 no attempt was made to apply the Schachter guidelines.
The Court simply noted that it would suspend the declaration of invalidity for “12 months in order to enable the government to comply with
these reasons.”
In R. v. Powley,112 the Court refused to extend a suspended declaration of invalidity ordered by the Ontario Court of Appeal, but again the
decision did not focus exclusively on the Schachter criteria. The Court
noted that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction and discretion to suspend
its declaration, but stated that “[t]his power should continue to be used
only in exceptional situations in which a court of general jurisdiction
deems that giving immediate effect to an order will undermine the very
purpose of that order or otherwise threaten the rule of law.” The idea
that a suspended declaration is exceptional and preserves the rule of law
and prevents chaos relates to the Schachter guidelines, but the idea that
a suspended declaration can be used when an immediate declaration
would “undermine the very purpose of that order” is a new and somewhat circular addition to the Schachter guidelines. The Court added that
107
108
109
110
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112
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it was “within the Court of Appeal’s discretion to suspend the application of its ruling to other members of the Métis community in order to
foster cooperative solutions and ensure that the resource in question was
not depleted in the interim, thereby negating the value of the right.”
Concerns about promoting co-operative solutions may very well be
compelling in the Aboriginal rights context,113 but they are not captured
in the three-point Schachter guidelines.
The most notable and controversial application of the Schachter criteria in 2003 was the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal reading in
the ability of same-sex couples to marry. The Court of Appeal rejected
the federal government’s request for a suspended declaration on the
basis that “there is no evidence before this court that a declaration of
invalidity without a period of suspension will pose any harm to the
public, threaten the rule of law, or deny anyone the benefit of legal recognition of their marriage.”114 This was a classic rule-based approach to
the exercise of discretion. The facts of the case at hand did not fit into
the three categories or pigeonholes in Schachter, and this was taken by
the Court of Appeal to be determinative without the need for any further
analysis or interpretation. The refusal to suspend the declaration of invalidity in Halpern has been intensely controversial. On the one hand, it
can be defended as based on the traditional principle of rights requiring
effective, prompt, and meaningful remedies even though this principle
does not feature prominently in the Schachter guidelines. On the other
hand, it can be opposed on the basis that by creating immediate samesex marriages, it fettered the role of Parliament in responding to the
decision even though consideration of the appropriate role of legislatures and the courts is rejected by the Schachter guidelines. My point
here is not to attempt to resolve the controversy over whether a suspended declaration of invalidity should have been issued in Halpern, but
only to note how the mechanical application of the Schachter guidelines
avoided discussion of the contested principles of effective remedies and
113
For an elaboration of how delayed declarations of invalidity may facilitate treatymaking, see my “Remedies in Aboriginal Litigation” in Magnet & Dorey, supra, note 27; and
my “Remedies for Violations of Aboriginal Rights” (1992) 21 Man. L.J. 498. More generally,
see Shin Imai, “Sound Science, Careful Policy Analysis and Ongoing Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Lands and Resources Disputes” (2003) 41
Osgoode Hall L.J. 587.
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proper institutional role that should have been central to whether the
Court of Appeal’s declaration ought to have had immediate effect or
been subject to a period of suspension.
2. The Judgments and the Three Models of Discretion
The judicial approach to suspended declarations of invalidity demonstrates some of the affinities between strong forms of discretion and
rule-based discretion. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in
Schachter created a three-category rule for the use of suspended declarations of invalidity that was based on examples taken from the existing
case law. Judges who follow the Schachter guidelines must determine
whether the case at hand fits into these three categories. Sometimes, as
in Trociuk, this process of applying the rules will require interpretation
of the rule and reasoning by analogy. Trociuk was not a case about
underinclusive benefits, but Deschamps J. for the Court determined that
it was analogous to such a case because an immediate declaration of
invalidity would deprive mothers of a legitimate and constitutional
operation of the impugned statute, even though the law also constituted
unjustified discrimination against men. This was a significant expansion
of the Schachter guidelines,115 but one that was based on the
interpretation of the underlying rule created in Schachter. It did not
require a sustained analysis of why a declaration of invalidity should be
suspended or what effects this would have on either the successful
Charter applicant or the government, but it did make the third Schachter
category more flexible and expansive.
Figueroa stands at the other extreme as the Court simply ordered a
12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity without any attempt to apply the Schachter criteria. The paucity of reasoning on this
issue suggests that the Court was acting as if the decision to suspend the
declaration was a matter of strong discretion. The Court in Figueroa
could perhaps have made an effort, as it did in Trociuk, to fit the case
into the Schachter categories of a threat to a rule of law or public danger

115
The Schachter guidelines applied more directly in Nova Scotia v. Martin, supra,
note 4, because an immediate declaration of invalidity would have prevented eligible people
from receiving workers’ compensation benefits simply because the existing scheme unconstitutionally excluded those who suffered from chronic pain from receiving the benefits.
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or an underinclusive benefit. It likely did not make such an attempt
because the case represented an even bigger stretch of the categories
than Trociuk. An immediate declaration of invalidity in this case would
likely have caused some confusion for election officials, but it would
hardly have threatened the rule of law or public safety, and it would not
have deprived anyone of a legitimate and constitutional benefit. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a suspension was appropriate in order
to give Parliament time to replace the existing regime with a constitutional one and to select from among a range of constitutional options.
The use of a suspended declaration of invalidity in Figueroa accords with what Sujit Choudhry and I have observed elsewhere has been
the largely silent evolution of the suspended declaration of invalidity
“beyond its origins as an emergency measure” into “a powerful dialogic
device that allows a court to remand complex issues to legislative institutions.”116 At the same time, it is striking that the Court has said so little
about this evolution. This silence may also explain why the Court has
yet to confront the problems created by increased use of suspended
declaration of invalidity, including the potential of leaving applicants
without tangible remedies in part because of the delay sanctioned by the
Court117 and in part because of the norm of legislatures amending their
laws in a prospective fashion that does not address the harms of the
past.118 My point is not that the courts should return to a mechanical
application of the Schachter categories, but rather that they should more
openly recognize the complex and conflicting principles at stake.
There may be a reason why remedial discretion in this context has
bounced between the extremes of rule-based and strong discretion.
Rule-based discretion by its nature of relying on self-executing categories often makes discussion of the underlying rationale for the rule unnecessary. In Schachter, the Court went out of its way of avoiding
principles when it stated that the decision to suspend a declaration
“should…turn not on considerations of the role of the courts and the
legislature, but rather on considerations listed earlier relating to the
effect of an immediate declaration on the public.”119 Thus, the principle
116
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of proper institutional rule, as articulated and discussed by all the judges
in Doucet-Boudreau, was put off bounds for discussion. Likewise, there
was no explicit discussion of the principle of effective and meaningful
remedies, again a principle that is discussed by all judges in DoucetBoudreau. There is something about the certainty sought by rule- and
category-based discretion that is hostile to the discussion of underlying
principles that are themselves open-ended and subject to differing interpretations. It is almost as if judges applying rules or exercising strong
discretion do not say too much, lest one of their colleagues disagree
with them. In this sense, the suspended declaration of invalidity cases
are generally unanimous decisions, whereas the more principled approach taken in cases like Doucet-Boudreau and Okanagan Indian Band
produces a divided Court that does not agree on the weight or even the
relevance of the competing principles.
The absence of attention to principle in rule-based discretion may
promote a flight to strong discretion. Judges who find that the rules and
categories, even when extended by analogical reasoning, are not appropriate may be tempted to make the leap, seen in Figueroa, towards
strong forms of discretion. To be sure, the leap is a large one, but when
judges make it they find themselves on familiar ground. In other words,
both strong and rule-based forms of discretion are characterized by their
neglect of underlying principles and by their ability to produce decisions
that, at first glance, do not seem to invite controversy and debate. Another similarity is that both rule-based and strong discretion may be
inherently unstable and unpredictable. Judges will fight the limited
categories of the rules in order to achieve justice in a particular case, but
the result will often be the unpredictability of strong forms of discretion
that appear to be based on the will of the judges. Both forms of discretion are unsatisfying because they allow judges to make decisions that
appear to be blind to important considerations about whether an effective remedy has been ordered and whether institutional roles have been
respected.
The Supreme Court needs to revisit the test for suspending declarations of invalidity. The status quo of bouncing from the rule-based approach seen in Trociuk and Martin to the strong discretion of Figueroa
in the space of less than a year is not acceptable. The controversy over
the refusal to suspend the declaration of invalidity in Halpern also demonstrates the need to grapple with the underlying principles. Many people expected the Court of Appeal to suspend the declaration of invalidity
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to give the legislature an opportunity to act and were taken by surprise
when the Court of Appeal refused to do so. At the same time, the Court
of Appeal cannot be criticized too harshly because it was following a
rule established, but often not followed, by the Supreme Court. The
prediction that the Court of Appeal would delay any declaration of invalidity in the gay marriage case avoided dealing with the Schachter categories and the statement in Schachter that concerns about appropriate
institutional role should not enter into a decision whether to suspend a
declaration of invalidity. Such avoidance was, of course, encouraged by
the Supreme Court’s own avoidance of this troublesome precedent.
An important step toward a more principled approach to suspended
declarations of invalidity will be to re-evaluate both the three examples
in Schachter and the statement that concerns about the appropriate role
of courts and legislatures should not enter into the decision whether to
suspend a declaration of invalidity. A minimalist reform is for the Court
to follow the path of Trociuk and extend the three categories by analogy.
Reasoning by analogy from the Schachter categories may reveal some
more general principles which may support the specific rule. For example, the underinclusive legislation example in Schachter as fleshed out
by Trociuk now seems to embrace a broader concern about the harmful
effects of an immediate declaration of invalidity in preventing legitimate, needed, and constitutional uses of a law that is unconstitutional in
only some of its applications. Analogies can also be made to how courts
save constitutional aspects of a law by severance or by reading down or
reading in. This process of reasoning could improve the Schachter factors and make them more flexible, but judges will still be chained by the
three Schachter categories. Moreover, a focus on these three categories
will likely fail to produce a full outline of the relevant principles that
should inform remedial decision-making. For example, the principles of
effective remedies and proper institutional role that were so central to
Doucet-Boudreau are not present in the Schachter categories of appropriate cases to use a suspended declaration of invalidity. These general
principles are not present in the Schachter categories even though they
played a central role when the Court in Schachter articulated helpful and
workable principles to guide judges when deciding whether unconstitutionally underinclusive legislation should be extended by a reading in
remedy, or struck down.
Bruce Ryder has suggested a more maximalist reform of the
Schachter guidelines for suspended declarations of invalidity. Professor
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Ryder argues that the decision whether to suspend a declaration of
invalidity should be expanded into a general balancing of interests test.
The government should have a section 1-type burden to demonstrate
that an immediate declaration of invalidity would “have a negative
impact on the exercise of Charter rights or freedoms, or a negative
impact on some other compelling social interests.”120 This proposal has
the virtue of making clear that the government has to justify a suspended declaration of invalidity and of opening up the reasons for a
suspended declaration of invalidity to a more open-ended list of “compelling social interests” that are important enough under section 1 of the
Charter to justify a limit on Charter rights. There is also precedent in
Schachter for looking to the developed jurisprudence under section 1 of
the Charter to guide remedial decision-making. Nevertheless, the incorporation of section 1 reasoning in Schachter to help guide the decision
whether to strike an unconstitutional law down or save it by reading in
has not been entirely satisfactory. It only eliminates reading in as a remedy in cases where the objective is unconstitutional or the law is not
rationally connected to the objective. This approach runs the risk of
either doing too little in the many cases decided on issues of least drastic
means or perhaps doing too much when, as in Halpern, the court appears to be sceptical about whether the objectives of the unconstitutional
law are important enough to limit a Charter right. Justice La Forest, in
his concurrence in Schachter, complained that the incorporation of section 1 reasoning could “encourage a mechanistic approach to the process, rather than encourage examination of more fundamental issues.”121
In my view, the fundamental principles at stake in remedial decision-making are not so much section 1 considerations, but the issues of
effective remedies, proper institutional role, and fairness that are discussed by all nine judges in Doucet-Boudreau. Under such an approach,
decisions about suspended declarations of invalidity might look more
like the majority judgment in Doucet-Boudreau where there is acknowledgement of remedial discretion, but discussion of a number of competing principles which animate the exercise of that discretion. Such an
approach will not result in agreement in all cases, as witnessed by the
division of the Court in Doucet-Boudreau about the relevant weight that
120
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should be given to the multiple principles in the particular context. Nevertheless, it would invite judges to give fuller reasons to justify their
judicial choices and allow for the refinement of the relevant principles
in a manner that has so far not occurred as courts have at various times
been attracted to an application of the Schachter categories or a strong
discretion to suspend declarations without resort to either those categories or full reasons.
What factors would guide judges under a more principled approach
to the use of suspended declarations of invalidity? An important factor,
and one that has been neglected in the present jurisprudence of suspended declarations, is the need to provide effective and meaningful
remedies to successful Charter applicants. Judges would be encouraged
to consider the anomalous position that successful Charter applicants
find themselves in when they win a Charter victory only to be told that
the unconstitutional law will remain valid for another 6 to 24 months.
The courts should consider whether the successful Charter applicant
should be exempted from the period of delay in light of the principle
that successful Charter applicants should receive meaningful remedies.122 An additional or alternative remedy in some cases might be a
higher cost award to the successful Charter applicant. Courts should also
consider the position of those who are in an identical position to the
successful applicants, but who may not be exempted from the suspended
declaration of invalidity. They can encourage the legislature to devise
meaningful remedies by assuming that remedial legislation departs from
the usual norm of legislation only having prospective effect. Such an
approach may respond to potential inequities caused by exempting the
successful Charter applicant but not others similarly situated.123 Courts
122
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should also address whether they will retain jurisdiction during the period of the suspension in order to minimize the damage to the Charter
during the period of the suspension.124
An important issue for the Supreme Court to decide is whether
considerations of institutional role should enter into the decision
whether to suspend declarations of invalidity. Following the principled
approach in Doucet-Boudreau, courts should in my view consider the
need “to respect the relationships with and separation of functions
among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary”125 and the limits
of the judicial function when deciding whether to suspend a declaration
of invalidity. This would require rejection or perhaps qualification of
Lamer C.J.’s dicta in Schachter126 that such considerations are not
relevant in deciding whether to suspend a declaration of invalidity. In
some cases, it would be appropriate for courts to acknowledge that the
legislature can employ a greater and more creative range of remedies
than the court can. The legislature can amend more laws than are before
the court. It can also devise creative new solutions to constitutional
problems that would exceed even the most robust understanding of the
judicial function. For example, a delayed declaration of invalidity in a
case such as M. v. H.127 allowed the legislature an opportunity to engage
in comprehensive reform that could not be achieved even by a robust
reading in remedy with respect to the impugned statute. In its response
to M. v. H., the Ontario legislature also created the controversial
category of “same-sex partner” as an alternative to the recognition of
same-sex spouses, even though it extended benefits equally to both
categories. Delayed declarations of invalidity in the case of unconstitutional electoral boundaries gave the legislature the option of expanding
the number of seats in the legislature in order to have manageable ridings in the north and other remote areas whereas even the most intrusive
judicial remedy would only require the boundaries to be redrawn within
the existing number of seats.128 Delayed declarations of invalidity can
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number of seats.128 Delayed declarations of invalidity can allow legislatures to enact remedies that the court alone could not enact.
As recognized by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Corbiere v. Canada,129
suspended declarations of invalidity can allow governments to consult
with those affected by the remedies and “[c]onstitutional remedies
should encourage the government to take into account the interests, and
views, of minorities.” The government can take the time provided by the
delayed declaration to engage in consultation with the minorities intended to benefit from the remedy to determine how their priorities,
needs, and aspirations should affect the remedy.130 The government can
also consult with others who are affected by the remedy and who may
play a role in determining whether it will be effective, in order to determine that the remedy does not “impose substantial hardships that are
unrelated to securing the right.”131
A principled approach to suspended declarations can also recognize
what has frequently been described as a partnership or a dialogue between the courts and legislatures, in which the two institutions play
distinct and complementary roles. A recognition of a remedial dialogue
or partnership would also accord with McLachlin C.J.’s recognition in
her extra-judicial writings that delayed declarations of invalidity are a
Canadian innovation that can facilitate judicial and legislative cooperation.132 At the same time, it can be argued that dialogue can occur
with or without delayed declarations of invalidity. Parliament responded
to Schachter by reducing the period of parental leave not when the Supreme Court issued a delayed declaration of invalidity, but rather when
lower courts read in biological parents into parental leave benefits de-
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signed for adoptive parents. The federal government and many provinces responded to M. v. H. with new legislation even though it was only
Ontario that was subject to the delayed declaration of invalidity. It must
be acknowledged that the legislature can exercise its legislative function
with or without a suspended declaration of invalidity.133
Nevertheless, a delay can serve the important purpose of prompting
the government to address the issue. It fits into a pattern of dialogic
democracy in which the courts place issues concerning the treatment of
rights onto the legislative agenda when the legislature might otherwise
wish to avoid the issue or leave the status quo in place. The dissenters in
Doucet-Boudreau would likely object to a democracy forcing justification for suspended declarations of invalidity. They might well argue that
such a remedy would be designed to “put … pressure on the government
to act. This kind of pressure is paradigmatically associated with political
actors.”134 In my view, this is too absolutist a view of the separation of
powers. An inflexible rule against considering institutional role when
suspending a declaration of invalidity does not fit the many cases in
which the courts have used delayed declarations as a way of remanding
complex issues back to the legislature.135
An immediate declaration of invalidity, or indeed creative reading in
remedies,136 may sap democracy by creating the impression that courts
are capable of solving all of society’s constitutional problems without
requiring legislators to rethink their decisions in light of the court’s
rulings. An immediate declaration of invalidity may also create entitlements that will unduly constrain the range of legislative choices.137
Although he is generally sceptical about dialogic uses of delayed declarations of invalidity, Professor Ryder recognizes that an immediate
133
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declaration of invalidity could “narrow the range of practical options to
the democratically accountable branch of government” and that a suspended declaration could be justified in some cases on the basis that it
“would respect the primacy of the legislature’s law-making role.”138 A
judge may, subject to other factors such as the need to ensure an effective and meaningful remedy, be justified in suspending a declaration of
invalidity in order to allow the legislature an opportunity to exercise the
full range of constitutional processes and options in responding to the
court’s finding that the existing law is unconstitutional.
It is not clear whether the Court will accept the relevance of institutional or dialogic factors in determining whether a suspended declaration of invalidity is appropriate. As discussed above, Lamer C.J. rejected
the relevance of such considerations in Schachter. More recently, the
majority judgment in Doucet-Boudreau demonstrated some discomfort
with the metaphor of dialogue. Justices Iacobucci and Arbour stated that
“judicial restraint and metaphors such as ‘dialogue’ must not be elevated
to the level of strict constitutional rules to which the words of section 24
can be subordinated.”139 It is difficult to know whether this is something
of an aside or a rethinking of previous uses of the dialogue metaphor by
the Court. The Court’s invocation of the dialogue metaphor has not been
consistent with some judges using dialogue as a principle for deference
to legislative replies and others using it as a justification for striking
down a law.140 More fundamentally, the Court has used dialogue in
different ways, sometimes suggesting that it represents the idea that
courts can add something to social and political debates that would not
otherwise be present or fully heard, and on other occasions suggesting
dialogue can result in the courts’ and legislatures’ holding each other
accountable, or that dialogue encourages the legislature to act on an
interpretation of the Charter that differs from that of the Court.141

138

Ryder, “Suspending the Charter,” supra, note 102, at 285-86.
Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 53.
140
See my “Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics” (2004), 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d)
49 assessing the inconsistent use of the dialogue metaphor in R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309,
and Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66.
141
See my “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481,
on different understandings of dialogue implicit in the Court’s use of the metaphor in R. v.
Mills, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 668.
139

148

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

In my view, the dialogue metaphor is most useful to describe the
constitutional theory implicit in the Charter and other modern bills of
rights that allow ordinary legislation enacted by democratically elected
legislatures to limit or derogate from rights as interpreted and enforced
by the independent judiciary. The concept of dialogue and the related
concept of respect for institutional role should play a role in the remedial decisions of the court. Canadian courts have often relied on general
declarations to allow both the executive and the legislature flexibility to
play their role in selecting the precise means to honour constitutional
obligations.142 Delayed declarations of invalidity can allow the legislature an opportunity to select from among the widest range of constitutional options, including the full range of legislative options under
sections 1 and 33 of the Charter. Although some assert that legislation
cannot be a remedy, Canada in fact has a long history of remedial legislation.143 Given its central role in Doucet-Boudreau and indeed in that
part of Schachter that relates to the choice between reading in and striking down as a remedy, the idea that respect for the respective roles of
courts and legislatures should never enter into the decision whether to
suspend a declaration of invalidity is not sustainable. That does not
mean, however, that this principle will be interpreted in the same way
by all judges or that it is the exclusive or necessarily the weightiest
principle in remedial decision-making.

V. CONCLUSION
Remedial discretion is an important feature of the Charter. It is
needed to ensure effective enforcement of the Charter, but it must also
be conceptualized in a manner that makes it part of the Charter. One
approach is to conceptualize it as a strong discretion that gives trial
judges much freedom and restrains appellate courts from interfering.
This approach is not consistent with the idea that people have rights to
remedies, and the emphasis on rational explanation and principled reasoning when interpreting Charter rights and when deciding whether
limits on Charter rights have been justified. Dissenting judges in both
142
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Doucet-Boudreau and Okanagan Indian Band expressed concerns that
the Court was sanctioning strong discretion or an unpredictable “judicial
carte blanche”144 in devising remedies under section 24(1) and awarding
interim or advance costs in public interest litigation. The greatest danger
of strong remedial discretion is seen in a case such as Figueroa, in
which the Court exercises a discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity without giving real reasons for why it is doing so. The flip side of
strong discretion is seen in cases such as Schachter in which the Court
articulates three categories that purport to outline all the circumstances
in which a suspended declaration of invalidity is appropriate. All that
judges need do then is decide whether the case at hand fits the categories. A more sophisticated approach to rule-based discretion was taken
in Trociuk when the Court interpreted the Schachter categories and
extended them by analogy. If strong discretion is under-governed by
law, rule-based discretion is over-governed in the sense that judges have
little freedom to devise and justify new remedies in response to new
rights and new circumstances. The main weakness of both strong and
rule-based discretion is that they allow judges to make momentous remedial decisions with inadequate attention to principles and with inadequate reasons.
A principled approach to remedial decision-making attempts to
make the exercise of remedial discretion more consistent with the approach taken to the interpretation of the rest of the Charter. The key to
principled remedial decision-making is not that a right answer will
magically appear, but that the judges and parties can reach some tentative agreement on the relevant principles and then debate the scope and
relative weight of each principle in the particular context. This is what
occurred in Doucet-Boudreau even though the Court split 5:4 over what
principle was most important. The majority stressed the need for effective and meaningful remedies in the context of a chronic violation of
section 23 of the Charter and the minority stressed the competing principle of appropriate institutional role. At the same time, the majority in
Doucet-Boudreau did not ignore the principles of proper institutional
role and fairness to the governmental defendants, and the minority attempted to argue that its approach was consistent with remedial effectiveness. Doucet-Boudreau is a positive sign in the development of
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remedies under the Charter because all the judges agreed on the relevant
principles, even though at the end of the day they did not agree on what
those principles required and which were most important in the particular case. Nevertheless, the decision has provided a principled framework
for the future.
Okanagan Indian Band is a more troubling case because the judges
did not agree about what principles should inform a trial judge’s discretion to order interim or advance costs. The majority stressed the principle of access to justice while the minority restricted advance costs to
cases decided under the prior common law. The majority itself could
have made its decision more principled by stressing the importance to
the public interest of hearing claims of Aboriginal rights while not prejudging the particular case. The suspended declaration of invalidity
cases are the most troubling as they avoid examination of principles
such as the need for effective remedies and the need to respect institutional role, and haphazardly bounce back and forth from a categorical
rule-based approach to a strong discretion approach. Principled remedial
decision-making is no recipe for agreement, but it should, as it did in
Doucet-Boudreau, produce a more wide-ranging and substantive debate
about the best way to exercise remedial discretion.

